Technological University Dublin

ARROW@TU Dublin
Books/Book Chapters
2022-05-27

Lobbying Regulation
John Hogan
Technological University Dublin, john.hogan@tudublin.ie

Alberto Bitonti
Università della Svizzera Italiana

Follow this and additional works at: https://arrow.tudublin.ie/totalarcscbk
Part of the Comparative Politics Commons

Recommended Citation
Bitonti, A., and Hogan, J. 2022. ‘Lobbying Regulation.’ In Phil Harris, Alberto Bitonti, Craig S. Fleisher and
Anne Skorkjær Binderkrantz (Eds), The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Interest Groups, Lobbying and Public
Affairs. Basingstoke: Palgrave. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-13895-0_105-1

This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open
access by ARROW@TU Dublin. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Books/Book Chapters by an authorized
administrator of ARROW@TU Dublin. For more
information, please contact arrow.admin@tudublin.ie,
aisling.coyne@tudublin.ie, gerard.connolly@tudublin.ie.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons
Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 4.0 License

L

Lobbying Regulation
Alberto Bitonti1 and John Hogan2
1
Università della Svizzera Italiana, Lugano,
Switzerland
2
Technological University Dublin, Dublin,
Ireland
Keywords

Lobbying rules · Regulation · Transparency ·
Accountability · Mandatory register · Lobbyist
registration · Self-regulation · Legislative
footprint · Public agenda

Definition
Lobbying regulation refers to the set of rules,
norms, and practical frameworks that aim to
shape how lobbying is done in a speciﬁc political
system. Rules include pieces of legislation and
regulatory provisions such as laws or ministerial
decrees; norms include codes of conduct or ethical
standards enforced more or less thoroughly in the
various contexts; practical frameworks refer to
actual models or platforms (governmental or private) designed and used to enable lobbying and
participation, for instance in consultation
processes.
Such sets of rules, norms, and frameworks
regard a wide range of topics and domains, relative to policymakers on the one hand and to

interest groups and lobbyists on the other. These
include lobbying registers (of lobbyists and stakeholders), revolving doors (between public and
private ofﬁces) and conﬂicts of interest, political
ﬁnancing, public procurement and anti-corruption, the disclosure of meetings between public
ofﬁcials and representatives of interest groups, the
transparency and the general openness of the
policymaking processes, and the accountability
of policymakers.
In the following sections of this entry, we provide an overview of the above-mentioned areas of
lobbying regulation, with a special focus on lobbying registers (object of most scholars’ attention
in this ﬁeld). We set out the reasons that have
generally been put forward for the adoption of
dedicated lobbying laws and discuss the indexes
and the methodological aspects related to comparative research on different lobbying regulations.

A Wide Set of Domains
Studies on lobbying regulation represent a niche
of the broader literature on lobbying and interest
groups, which focuses on the various regulatory
measures implemented typically by governmental
authorities to shape the forms and the practices of
lobbying in a given political context.
While most of the attention on this topic has
focused on state laws purposely labeled as regulating lobbying or the representation of interests
(starting from the oldest laws approved in the
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USA at both state and federal level, expanding the
view in recent decades to the limited number of
countries – currently 18 – which have also
adopted speciﬁc legislation on lobbying), lobbying regulation can actually be considered much
broader than what the label seems to suggest. In
fact, as ▶ lobbying is a complex and dynamic
phenomenon, regulating its forms and channeling
its practices necessarily requires us to deal with a
multiplicity of domains and areas.
Such domains and areas are all those generally
regarding the relationship between policymakers
and interest groups as well the design of the
policymaking process itself, operating under the
values of ▶ transparency (disclosing what happens) and of participation (allowing fairer and
unbiased participation in policy processes).
Notably, one can focus on:
• Registers of stakeholders, conceived as lists
of organizations of different kinds that have an
interest in participating in some policy processes. These registers can be more or less
strongly connected to the access to speciﬁc
policymaking arenas and can require the disclosure of a certain amount of information on
the organization itself, on its representatives,
and on its lobbying activities (such as the number of lobbyists employed or the amount of
money spent, generally or on speciﬁc
dossiers).
• Registers of lobbyists. Sometimes overlapping with the previous category, these are
lists that somehow enable individual professionals to be legally acknowledged as lobbyists
(see also ▶ “Lobbyist” in this Encyclopedia).
These registers can also be more or less
strongly connected to some obligations (such
as periodic ﬁling of reports on activities, or
abiding to a code of conduct) and rights (such
as permanent access to governmental
buildings).
• Procedures of consultation, designed and
implemented in different ways by public
authorities (more or less open and inclusive/
exclusive), for example, through ▶ Regulatory
Impact Assessment (RIA) processes or through
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•

•

•

•

•

informal dialogues with speciﬁc stakeholders
(see also ▶ “Stakeholder Consultations”).
Physical access to governmental buildings,
such as Parliaments or Ministries. As every
institution regulates the physical access to its
own premises, this can be relevant for how
lobbying is actually conducted in speciﬁc
circumstances.
Revolving doors. The expression generally
refers to policymakers becoming lobbyists
after the end of their mandate, thus enjoying
an “undue” advantage in comparison with
others in terms of “insider” knowledge, networks, etc. (see ▶ “Revolving Doors”). Some
regulatory solutions are based on a “cooling
off” period, which requires a certain amount of
time to pass between the end of a public ofﬁce
(usually at top levels) and the position of lobbyist for a private organization. In this case, the
criteria to be formally considered as a lobbyist
become once again crucial. The revolving
doors can also concern the opposite direction,
with private actors getting elected or becoming
policymakers, in some cases keeping their
positions in the private sector, with concerns
of conﬂict of interests or undue overlap of
positions.
Conﬂicts of interest. Partially related to the
previous point, this issue concerns the way to
address, disclose, or generally regulate potential conﬂicts of ▶ interest of policymakers having speciﬁc private interests, interests that can
be affected by a decision taken in the public
capacity.
Political ﬁnancing. As the ﬁnancing of political parties and political candidates – as well as
of think tanks – is one of the main strategies
that interest groups can use to try to gain access
to, or to exert inﬂuence over, policymakers, the
legal framework concerning political ﬁnancing
(who can ﬁnance whom, and how transparent
this should be) can be deﬁnitely considered as a
relevant area to regulate lobbying as well.
Public agendas of policymakers, with calendars of meetings of top public ofﬁcials
disclosed in real-time or ex-post, in order to
aggregately “measure” (and account for) the
contacts held with speciﬁc interest groups.
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• Legislative footprints. These are more or less
short reports that ﬂank pieces of legislation or
policies in general, explaining the process that
led to the approval of the ﬁnal decision, including the inputs of stakeholders involved and
possibly an explanation of the reasons behind
the choices made.
• Public procurement and anti-corruption.
Public procurement (public authorities buying
products or services on the market) is one
important area of lobbying, with companies
being directly commissioned or participating
in public tenders to win such contracts. This
is probably the ﬁeld where the risk of ▶ corruption is higher. That is why public procurement procedures and anti-corruption measures
can be considered part of a comprehensive
regulatory framework of lobbying.
In addition to what is mentioned above, one
may also consider other general elements of a
political system which more or less indirectly
affect how lobbying is done in a given context,
such as the constitutional framework, the party
system, the judicial system, freedom of information, the political culture, or the dimension of the
State itself.

Different Kinds of Lobbying Registers
Researchers on lobbying regulation (both political
scientists and legal scholars) devoted most of their
attention to lobbying registers, main objects of all
the pieces of legislation speciﬁcally (labeled as)
dedicated to regulating lobbying (Brinig,
Holcombe, & Schwartzstein, 1993; Chari,
Hogan, & Murphy, 2010; Chari, Hogan, Murphy,
& Crepaz, 2019; Crepaz & Chari, 2018; Greenwood & Dreger, 2013; Holman & Luneburg,
2012; McGrath, 2008; Newmark, 2005; Opheim,
1991; Ozymy, 2010; Thomas, 1998).
As mentioned, such registers may take different forms, according to the subject issuing the
register, to the actors which are targeted for registration, and to the nature of the registration itself.
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As for the subject creating the register, the most
important distinction is between registers
implemented by private actors (such as professional associations of lobbyists or lobbying agencies) and registers created and managed by
governmental actors. The former are voluntary
in nature and represent a case of self-regulation,
being usually associated with the “moral” obligation to abide to some code of conduct (even if
general concerns are usually raised over the actual
possibilities of checks of compliance and sanctions, so that according to some they cannot even
be considered a case of regulation; see Chari et al.,
2010). The latter are issued by governmental institutions, such as legislative assemblies, ministries,
or speciﬁc government agencies/ofﬁces and are
indeed of various types.
As for the actors which are targeted for registration, some registers are conceived as lists of
organizations (stakeholders of some policy process or in some cases lobbying ﬁrms), others are
directed at individuals that professionally engage
in lobbying activities (in some cases they refer
only to consultant lobbyists, excluding “in
house” lobbyists – this is for example the case of
the UK Registrar of Consultant Lobbyists, or of
the Polish Register of professional lobbyists),
others combine the two types, for example,
demanding the stakeholders to disclose who acts
as a lobbyist on their behalf.
As for the nature of the registration, three main
types of register can be identiﬁed:
1. Voluntary
2. Mandatory
3. Conditional.
Voluntary registers are open lists where individual professionals or organizations can voluntarily enroll, usually in exchange for beneﬁts of
some kind, if only in terms of reputation (Năstase
& Muurmans, 2018). As mentioned above, such
voluntary registers can be created by professional
associations – examples can be found in Spain,
Romania, or Latvia (Bitonti & Harris, 2017) – or
by governmental authorities, which invite organizations and professionals to enroll offering facilitated access to premises or involvement in
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consultation processes – such is the case of the
German Bundestag or European Union institutions until 2014.
Mandatory registers are conceived of as lists
that legally entitle enrolled actors to lobby, and
that theoretically aim to prevent those not in the
list from engaging in the activity. Examples of
these registers may be found in the USA, Canada,
Lithuania, Chile, Ireland, and France. Even if
these registers are usually assessed very positively
in various indexes of stringency (see section
below), a number of loopholes and caveats need
to be considered in some cases, regarding for
example the various deﬁnitions of lobbying
adopted, the exclusion of some categories of lobbyists (and of policymakers) from the domain of
application, or the more or less robust policy
implementation.
Conditional registers may be seen as a sort of
mid-way option between the previous two, as
such registers are formally voluntary, but public
authorities can require the presence in the register
itself as a condition to access consultation processes or to even meet policymakers. Such is the
case of the Transparency Register of the European
Union after 2014.

Motives for Adopting Lobbying
Regulations
▶ Lobbying is regarded by scholars and practitioners as a form of participation that permits
access to politics, going beyond just voting, in
order to inﬂuence actions, policies, decisions, or
their absence. However, the word lobbying is
often regarded negatively by the general public.
It is considered by many as a pejorative term
associated with “corruption” and “unethical practices” (Bitonti & Harris, 2017; McGrath, 2008).
Scandals have helped foster a perception that lobbying is in fact inﬂuence-peddling in which selfserving entities exercise greater than normal inﬂuence over policy outputs (Veksler, 2015).
Because of the negative perception of lobbying, demand has grown in many countries for the
introduction of speciﬁc regulations addressing the
practice of lobbying and the activities of lobbyists
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(Keeling, Feeney, & Hogan, 2017). Some governments, in response, have sought to introduce lobbying legislation with the objective of reducing
the potential for corruption and supporting a levelplaying ﬁeld in the policy-making process for
interest groups (Chari et al., 2010; Holman &
Luneburg, 2012). Thus, in a theoretical sense,
the justiﬁcation for the introduction of lobbying
regulations is founded upon ensuring both
▶ transparency and ▶ accountability in the political system and the policy-making process. It is
transparency that permits the public to hold policy-makers to account for their decisions, or the
lack thereof (Etzioni, 2010). If policymaking is
more transparent, not only the public will be able
to see how decisions are made, but the whole
process will allow for better decisions through
deliberative discussion and reﬂection.
Thus, lobbying laws try to regulate the activities of private actors who are seeking to inﬂuence
public institutions (Chari et al., 2010). As Brinig
et al. (1993, p. 377) point out the legislative regulation of lobbying takes “more account of the
general welfare and less account of private interests.” Lobbying regulations can be regarded as a
constituent part of the larger objective of ▶ open
government policies that have been implemented
across the world in recent decades. However, it is
vital that these lobbying regulations do not prevent citizens from approaching their elected representatives. Signiﬁcantly, Chari et al. (2010, p.
129) note “there is no evidence to suggest that any
lobbying legislation has inhibited ordinary citizens from going to see their representatives
about ordinary issues.”
Currently, 18 countries regulate their lobbying
industries through dedicated pieces of legislation,
but many of these only introduced regulations
after the turn of the century, or during the second
decade of the century in particular (Chari et al.,
2019).
In federations, such as the USA, Canada, and
Australia, there are lobbying regulations in place
at the national, state, and/or provincial levels. The
USA, which has the longest experience with regulating lobbying (having done so at the state level
since the late nineteenth century), sought to regulate lobbying at the federal level in 1946, 1995,
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and again in 2007 in response to episodes of
corruption and undue inﬂuence (Chari et al.,
2019; Zeller, 1948). Similarly, EU institutions
ﬁrst introduced lobbying regulations in 1996 and
then again in 2007 to provide a level-playing ﬁeld
for the participation of interest groups, and
strengthened these rules in 2011 and 2014 in
response to the cash for laws scandal.
Despite moves on the parts of many countries’
governments to regulating lobbying through speciﬁc lobbying laws, most jurisdictions in the
world today trust the industry to self-regulate, or
have only fragmented regulation in place (Bitonti
& Harris, 2017). Nevertheless, regulations extant
in neighboring jurisdictions, or emanating from
international institutions, can serve to persuade
countries to pursue their own lobbying regulations
(Crepaz, 2017). It is also the case that political
scandals involving lobbyists can push the issue of
lobbying regulation onto the domestic political
agenda. Of course, the election of a reformminded administration, coming to ofﬁce on a
reform mandate, or a reforming political entrepreneur within such an administration (Hogan &
Feeney, 2012), can also act as a driving force
behind the introduction of lobbying regulations.

Comparing Lobbying Regulations
Over the years a number of different approaches
have been developed and adopted in order to
quantitatively measure and compare the relative
strengths of lobbying regulations across countries.
Opheim’s index (1991) and Newmark’s index
(2005, 2017) focus upon domestic US regulatory
developments. Holman and Luneburg (2012) seek
to conceptualize the robustness of lobbying regulations while focusing on lobbying laws in
Europe. Chari et al. (2010) adopted the Center
for Public Integrity’s (CPI) “hired guns method”
for analyzing lobbying regulations, which results
in what they refer to as CPI scores. They found
that the CPI’s index possessed more of the measurements necessary to capture the robustness of
lobbying regulations – it had a higher content
validity than the other indices (Chari et al.,
2019). The CPI index employs eight major criteria
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for coding and scoring legislative texts: Deﬁnition
of Lobbyist; Individual Registration; Individual
Spending Disclosure; Employer Spending Disclosure; Electronic Filing; Public Access (to a register); Revolving Door Provisions (cooling-off
periods); and Enforcement. These criteria encompass a total of 48 detailed questions. Based on the
examination of a piece of legislation, each item
contained within it is assigned a numerical value
on the index according to the code given. Thus,
the coding and scoring process is conducted
manually.
The CPI score, a measure of the robustness of a
lobbying law, is calculated out of a maximum of
100 possible points. The more points that are
assigned to a piece of lobbying legislation the
more robust it is. Crepaz (2016, p. 5) deﬁnes
robustness as “the level of transparency and
accountability that the lobbying regulation can
guarantee.” While the CPI only applied its method
of analysis to US state and federal lobbying regulations, Chari et al. (2019) applied it to all of the
jurisdictions across globe that had introduced legislation regulating lobbying. This allowed for the
direct comparison of different regulatory systems.
When the CPI index is applied to various countries’ lobbying, legislation wide variations in the
robustness of those regulations become evident.
To enable better comparison between countries’
CPI scores, Chari et al. (2019) set out a
three-tiered classiﬁcation system for the level of
robustness of the regulations being examined.
Regulatory environments scoring above 60 points
are rated as high robustness systems, those scoring between 30 and 59 points are rated a medium
robustness systems and those scoring below 29
points are considered to be low robustness systems (Chari et al., 2019). Table 1 shows, in the
context of the theoretical classiﬁcations of Chari
et al. (2019) and CPI index’s major criteria for
coding and scoring legislative text, the regulatory
features that are likely to be encountered in low,
medium, and high robustness systems.
Lobbying regulations located in the same scoring band (same robustness) tend to have broadly
similar characteristics. For example, Ireland and
the Canadian federal government have medium
robustness systems in place that have cooling off
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Lobbying Regulation, Table 1 Features of the three classiﬁcations of the robustness of lobbying laws
Registration
regulations
Spending
disclosure

Electronic
ﬁling
Public access

Enforcement

Revolving
door
provisions

Low robustness systems
Rules on individual
registration, but few details
required
No rules on individual
spending disclosure, or
employer spending
disclosure
Weak on-line registration
and paperwork required
List of lobbyists available,
but not detailed, or updated
frequently
Little enforcement
capabilities invested in state
agency
No cooling off period
before former legislators
can register as lobbyists

Medium robustness systems
Rules on individual registration,
more details required

High robustness systems
Rules on individual registration
are extremely rigorous

Some regulations on individual
spending disclosure; none on
employer spending disclosure

Tight regulations on individual
spending disclosure, and
employer spending disclosure

Robust system for on-line
registration, no paperwork
necessary
List of lobbyists available,
detailed, and updated frequently

Robust system for on-line
registration, no paperwork
necessary
List of lobbyists and their
spending disclosures available,
detailed, and updated frequently
State agency can, and does,
conduct mandatory reviews /
audits
There is a cooling off period
before former legislators can
register as lobbyists

In theory state agency possesses
enforcement capabilities, though
infrequently used
There is a cooling off period
before former legislators can
register as lobbyists

Source: Chari et al. (2019)

periods – the minimum amounts of time in which
former politician and senior civil servants cannot
engage in lobbying activities on account of potential conﬂicts of interest.
Many of the countries that have introduced
lobbying regulations have tended, with a few
exceptions, Hungary for example, to make those
regulations more robust when it comes to
amending the initial legislation. In the case of
Canada, for example, its initial 1989 legislation,
the Lobbyist Registration Act, scores only 37 on
the CPI index, whereas the 2008 Lobbying Act
scores 50. The 2008 legislation introduced larger
and more signiﬁcant ﬁnes for lobbyists who break
the rules and new obligations. Table 2 summarizes
the international situation in terms of lobbying
laws according to the CPI index.

Conclusion
Lobbying regulation has deep roots in the value of
transparency that requires to disclose how lobbying is done, using the “sunshine” principle as a
disincentive for improper behaviors, according to
a famous remark by the US Supreme Court Justice

Louis Brandeis, who said “Sunlight is . . . the best
of disinfectants” (Etzioni, 2010).
However, as the ▶ open government philosophy has clariﬁed in the last few decades, the
values of accountability of policymakers (see
▶ “Accountability in Democracies”) and of stakeholders participation in policy processes are as
crucial in shaping a more comprehensive regulation of lobbying in a given political context.
Scholars of lobbying regulation have generally
devoted their attention to the analysis of the various pieces of legislation focusing on lobbyists
and on the lobbying profession. In this framework
we tackled the issue of lobbying registers, but we
outlined a wider set of areas and topics that can be
included in a more comprehensive analysis of
lobbying regulations, pertaining to the
policymaking process as much as the activities
of lobbyists and interest groups. We recalled the
motives that generally drive the introduction of
speciﬁc laws on lobbying, and brieﬂy illustrated
the indexes of robustness to compare different
regulatory frameworks.
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Lobbying Regulation, Table 2 CPI scores for lobbying regulations found internationally
Lobbying regulation
USA (2007)
Canada (2008)
Slovenia (2010)
Hungary (2006 and abandoned in 2011)
Lithuania (2001)
Chile (2014)
France (2016)
Ireland (2015)
Australia (2008)
Austria (2012)
JTR – EP and Commission (2014)
Mexico (2010)
Israel (2008)
UK (2014)
Poland (2005)
Netherlands (2012)
Commission (2008)
Germany (1951)
EP (1996)

CPI Score
62
50
47
45
44
42
42
37
33
32
32
29
28
28
27
24
24
17
15

Theoretical classiﬁcation (Chari et al., 2010)
High robustness
Medium robustness
Medium robustness
Medium robustness
Medium robustness
Medium robustness
Medium robustness
Medium robustness
Medium robustness
Medium robustness
Medium robustness
Low robustness
Low robustness
Low robustness
Low robustness
Low robustness
Low robustness
Low robustness
Low robustness

Source: Chari et al. (2010, 2019); Crepaz and Chari (2018)

Cross-References
▶ Accountability in Democracies
▶ Interest
▶ Lobbying
▶ Lobbyist
▶ Open Government
▶ Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA)
▶ Revolving Doors
▶ Stakeholder Consultations
▶ Transparency
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